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Sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the establishmentof a maritime boundary with Japan in the East China Sea are two ofChina’s remaining territorial disputes, and a foreign and national se-
curity policy priority in Beijing. The disputes have been a source of instability
in China-Japan relations, with risks of military conflict arising from their
overall strategic rivalry in East Asia but also from more specific military ac-
tivities in the disputed areas, which in a worst case scenario could lead to
unplanned collisions. This second type of risk has considerably increased in
recent years as a result of China’s decision to establish a more regular pres-
ence in the areas claimed by Japan, especially around the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, which Japan controls administratively – and for which the govern-
ment of Japan does not recognise the existence of a sovereignty dispute. (1)
The history of China’s policy on territorial disputes shows a willingness to
compromise to reach final border settlements under certain circumstances. Tay-
lor Fravel has demonstrated that counterintuitively, domestic insecurity was a
factor of compromise in negotiations over land boundaries, while a decline of
bargaining power was a factor in military escalation. (2) In maritime disputes,
Fravel showed that China constantly pursued delay, with two decisions to use
force in the South China Sea – against Vietnam in the Paracels (1974) and the
Spratlys (1988). (3) Delay is precisely what Deng Xiaoping advised for the East
China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands when he famously said in 1978 that
the two sides “should set the issue aside for a while” because it was not “an ur-
gent issue” and one for which “the next generation will have more wisdom.” (4)
In recent years, however, tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands resulted in
the appearance of crisis management negotiations on the agenda of China-
Japan relations, while the negotiation of a settlement of the sovereignty dispute
appeared to be completely unrealistic. 
While China has a long record of negotiating borders, it has no record of
concluding crisis management arrangements to diminish the risk of unin-
tended crises linked to maritime disputes. The 2002 Declaration on the Con-
duct of Parties in the South China Sea signed with ASEAN countries is
non-binding, and although it prevented the occupation of new features by
claimants in the South China Sea, it failed to prevent the current cycle of
tensions between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines that has included dan-
gerous standoffs at sea. The Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations offer no
example of a crisis management mechanism to decrease the risk of inci-
dents during periods of political tension. 
Is there a preference in Chinese foreign policy for avoiding agreements
that reduce military security risks with states with which it has active mar-
itime territorial disputes? Alastair Iain Johnston has analysed the develop-
ment by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) experts of a body of literature on
crisis management, reflecting to some degree the theoretical influence of
American Cold War concepts and more contemporary efforts by US think-
tanks to promote the idea with counterparts in Beijing. He concludes that
despite a clear increase in the attention the topic receives, a number of Chi-
nese characteristics limit the impact of the crisis management approach
on policy-making: specific PLA operational concepts, a “vision of Chinese
exceptionalism,” and the lack of strong crisis management institutions and
mechanisms. (5) A major obstacle to the conclusion of confidence-building
agreements is to be found in China’s negotiating tactics, and especially the
fact that China consistently requests an endorsement of general principles
as a precondition to starting technical talks when there are political stakes,
which is clearly very much the case in territorial disputes. (6) In the area of
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1. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “There is no doubt that the Senkaku
Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based
upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There
exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.” Source:
website of Japanese MOFA, “Senkaku Islands,” www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku (ac-
cessed on 11 March 2016).
2. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Dis-
putes, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008. 
3. Ibid., pp. 266-269. 
4. As quoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on its page “Set Aside Dispute and Pursue
Joint Development,” www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/
t18023.shtml (accessed on 18 July 2016).
5. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Prac-
tice in China,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 69, No.1, winter 2016, pp. 28-71.
6. Richard H. Solomon, “Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967-1984,” RAND monograph re-
port, 1995. 
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crisis management, which essentially in its restrictive acceptation in this
article addresses behavioural and communication aspects of military forces
in disputed territories (and the potentially positive political spill-over in
terms of strategic trust), political preconditions are problematic because
they tend to relate to sovereignty, which is precisely the area that crisis
management needs to circumvent to be successful. 
This paper offers a case study to contribute to the understanding of the
foreign policy goals China attaches to crisis management: the negotiations
over a Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism (MACM) with Japan
in the East China Sea from the beginning of the negotiations in 2008 to the
deadlock reached at the end of 2015. The MACM was conceived to facilitate
communication between the Chinese and the Japanese military forces in
order to prevent unintended collisions during times of close encounters. In
essence, it covers only military security risks. During the seven-year period
analysed in this paper, China has moved from being a reluctant negotiator
to interrupting the negotiations and finally accepting their resumption, but
only after setting such a high bar in terms of relative sovereignty gains that
the talks unravelled. The paper argues that the socialisation of China to con-
fidence-building norms in the security sphere – norms that the PRC’s strate-
gic community traditionally rejects – is making very slow progress despite
the increasing risk of incidents in maritime East Asia. It concludes that Chi-
nese foreign policy uses crisis management negotiations to secure a variety
of foreign policy goals linked to sovereignty and balance of power rather
than as a tool purely dedicated to diminishing the risk of military clashes
by freezing a status quo. This suggests that Chinese foreign policy in the
East China Sea does not aim at building a stable status quo but is still driven
by a quest for political and territorial gain and thus is willing to accept a
certain degree of risk. At the same time, the analysis shows that while the
Chinese strategic community is not fully convinced of the usefulness of “cri-
sis management” to reduce the risk of military incidents, support for the
idea is making relative progress. 
An overview of China-Japan crisis
management negotiations in the East China
Sea
In early October 2015, the Japanese press reported that negotiations with
China to build a MACM in the East China Sea had reached a deadlock. (7)
PLA Daily simply reported that “the scheme was rejected by China.” (8) The
reason invoked by the Japanese side was that China “objected to a Japanese
proposal that the mechanism would not apply to each countries’ territorial
waters and airspace.” For Japan, extending the mechanism to territorial wa-
ters and airspace would be tantamount to acknowledging China’s challenge
to Japan’s sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. According
to Tetsuo Kotani, an expert affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, “If the mechanism is applied to territorial waters, China would mis-
understand they can intrude as long as they communicate.” (9) On the Chi-
nese side, a military analyst involved in the negotiations argued that the
Japanese side proposed that the exclusion of a 12 nautical miles (nm) zone
around the disputed islands be specifically endorsed in the final document,
which “is unacceptable and unhelpful as no crisis management arrangement
excludes the geographic area under most intense dispute.” (10) Despite the
two sides’ stated willingness to decrease the risk of unintended collisions
between their military and law-enforcement vessels and their fishing boats,
the entire negotiation process unravelled as a result of a profound disagree-
ment regarding sovereignty and effective administration over the disputed
waters.
The MACM is one of three tracks of crisis management consultations be-
tween China and Japan, and the only one at the military-to-military level
(see Table 1). In the context of their tense relationship in the East China
Sea, China and Japan initiated crisis management negotiations in 2007,
with the goal of improving communication at the political and military-
to-military levels and for confidence building. The two driving forces were
the first Abe administration and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who
provided the political impetus during their 2007 summit meeting. Their
immediate concern was to prevent unintended incidents at sea from es-
calating into a full-blown crisis, in view of the presence in the East China
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7. “Talks on Japan-China Maritime Communication Deadlock,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 October
2015, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002471385 (accessed on 11 March 2016).
8. “China Rejects Japan-proposed Maritime Liaison Mechanism,” China Military Online, 8 October
2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2015-10/08/con-
tent_6713206.htm (accessed on 11 March 2016).
9. Quoted in “Diaoyu Islands Bring China-Japan Talks to a Stall in Discussion to Prevent Unwanted
Conflict in East China Sea,” South China Morning Post, 8 October 2015, www.scmp.com/news/
china/diplomacy-defence/article/1865079/diaoyu-islands-bring-china-japan-talks-stall-discus-
sion (accessed on 15 July 2016).
10. Author’s interview, Beijing, April 2016. 
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Table 1 – Japan-China crisis management mechanisms
Name





2008 Ministries of Defence





Ministries of Foreign Affairs lead delegations
representing government agencies involved 
in maritime policy
Build political confidence 
on maritime issues




Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Japan Coast Guard 
and China Maritime Safety Administration
Search and rescue joint operations
Source: James Przystup, John Bradford, and James Manicom, “Japan-China Maritime Confidence Building and Communications Mechanisms,” Pacnet Newsletter, No. 67, 
20 August 2013, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-67-japan-china-maritime-confidence-building-and-communications-mechanisms (accessed on 4 August 2016). 
Sea of vessels of both sides. The negotiations in 2007 did not have the
same sense of urgency that they later acquired at the end of 2012. It was
conceived as a military confidence-building exercise in the context of two
unresolved territorial disputes: the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty dis-
pute and the EEZ/continental shelf delimitation dispute (see Map 1). Ac-
cording to a senior Japanese official speaking off the record, the goal on
the Japanese side was also to establish a process by which regular interac-
tions with the Chinese military would generate positive spill-over into the
political relationship. (11)
The first round of talks regarding the establishment of a MACM (called
Maritime Communication Mechanism [MCM] at the time) was held on 21
April 2008 in Beijing. In the lead were the Ministries of Defence of the
two sides – the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defence of the
PRC and the International Policy Section of the Ministry of Defense of
Japan. The two sides joined a working group whose composition under-
scores the unique specificity of the talks in the broader picture of Japan-
China relations: they are the only ongoing negotiation led by the military
on both sides. 
Altogether, three rounds of talks took place before their interruption
by China in September 2012 (see Table 2). At the June 2012 meeting,
the joint Japan-China Working Group reached an understanding and
agreed in principle to establish an MCM with three main pillars: 1) an
annual meeting and regular expert meetings; 2) high-level hotlines be-
tween the defence authorities of the two countries; 3) direct communi-
cation between military vessels and aircraft (and an agreement on
common radio frequencies). (12) As a Japanese official involved in the ne-
gotiations noted, the understanding reached in June 2012 was good
enough to put in practice and could have started operating until politics
brought China-Japan tensions to a new peak. (13) As of early 2015, the
three elements of the structure agreed upon in 2012 were still the basis
on which Chinese and Japanese negotiators were discussing a possible
agreement. 
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11. Author’s interview, Tokyo, February 2015. 
12. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014 (Annual White Paper), Chapter 3, section 2,
www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html (accessed on 4 August 2016). 
13. Author’s interview, Tokyo, February 2015. 
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Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Promoting Crisis Management in the East China Sea,” February 2015, www.sipri.org/research/security/china/promot-
ing-crisis-management-in-the-east-china-sea (accessed on 11 March 2016).




























On 10 September 2012, the Government of Japan announced the pur-
chase of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. (14) In retaliation, the Chinese
government interrupted most communication channels. Even Track 2 se-
curity dialogues between academics and experts were cancelled. The pur-
chase of the three islands, labelled “nationalisation” by the Chinese press,
was described as “extremely dangerous” by the Xinhua News Agency and
as “the most serious challenge to Chinese sovereignty after WW2” by the
PLA Daily. (15) The mainstream analysis in the Chinese strategic community
was to understand the Japanese decision as a unilateral transformation
of the status quo, which as such required retaliation to re-establish bal-
ance and build a new status quo. This narrative was for example elabo-
rated by Zhang Junshe, a senior military officer with a PLA Navy think
tank: “The status quo of the Diaoyu Islands, which had lasted for about
four decades under the principle of shelving the dispute, was broken more
than one year ago when the Japanese government launched a unilateral
move to ‘purchase’ and ‘nationalize’ the islands.” (16) During the period of
interruption of the talks, tensions reached unprecedented levels, as de-
scribed in greater detail in the second section of this article. Bilateral re-
lations further deteriorated after Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni
Shrine in Tokyo on 26 December 2013. The Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman reacted by saying that the visit “jeopardize(d) the political
foundation of China-Japan relations and erect(ed) new barriers to the im-
provement and growth of bilateral relations,” adding that the Japanese
side had to “take all the consequences arising therefrom.” (17) Thus the nor-
malisation of bilateral diplomacy – including the resumption of crisis man-
agement negotiations – was tied by the Chinese side to a gesture by Japan
on historical issues.
After a hiatus of almost three years, the negotiations finally resumed in Jan-
uary 2015 on the basis of a four-point consensus (commonly known in Chi-
nese as sidian gongshi) reached in Beijing between Chinese State Councilor
Yang Jiechi and Japanese National Security Advisor Yachi Shotaro in November
2014. The result of intense but very discreet diplomatic consultations, the
consensus contained language on historical issues, a declaration of intention
to develop the bilateral relationship on the basis of “common strategic inter-
ests,” and a commitment to negotiating a crisis management mechanism. (18)
Crucially, the consensus paved the way for the first – and icy – summit meet-
ing between Prime Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping since both
took office, on the side-lines of the November 2014 APEC meeting in Beijing.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported a summit held at the request of the
Japanese side that resulted in a decision to implement the “four-point agree-
ment.” (19) This endorsement at the highest political level in Beijing was the
real turning point that made the resumption of talks a reality. 
At their fourth round of talks in Tokyo on 12 January 2015, the two sides
agreed that the mechanism should also cover the risk of air collisions, and
not only focus on dangerous encounters at sea. They also agreed to imple-
ment the mechanism at an early date. This came after a series of risky close
encounters between aircraft of the two sides in the aftermath of China es-
tablishing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea
in November 2013. The name of the mechanism thus became “Maritime
and Air Communication Mechanism.” (20) A Japanese participant described
the atmosphere as “friendly” and “highly constructive.” (21) The fifth meeting,
held in June 2015, was the occasion on which technical details were fi-
nalised regarding communication between aircraft. A lingering issue for the
two sides in 2015 was whether there should be a public written agreement
or if the content should remain confidential; according to interviews con-
16 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 3
14. These three islands are Minami-kojima, Kita-kojima, and Uotsuri-jima, which previously belonged
to the Kurihara family. The objective of their purchase by the Japanese government was to na-
tionalise them in order to prevent a similar initiative proposed in April 2012 by the Governor of
Tokyo, the ultra-nationalist Shintaro Ishihara, who wanted to administratively incorporate these
three islands into Tokyo’s municipality, explaining that the Japanese authorities had not defended
“Senkaku Islands” adequately against Chinese claims.
15. “China Voice: Japan Should Not Underestimate Severity of Diaoyu Island Issue,” Xinhua, 11 Sep-
tember 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/11/c_131843435.htm (ac-
cessed on 4 August 2016).
16. Zhang Junshe, “The US Should Take an Impartial Stance towards China’s Newly-established ADIZ,”
China-US Focus, 3 December 2013, http://m.chinausfocus.com/article/2214.html (accessed on
11 March 2016).
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press
Conference on December 26, 2013,” www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/t1112269.shtml (accessed on 11 March 2016).
18. The Chinese and the Japanese sides issued different English translations of the consensus: “China,
Japan Reach Four-point Agreement on Ties,” Xinhua, 7 November 2014, http://news.xin
huanet.com/english/china/2014-11/07/c_133772952.htm (accessed on 11 March 2016); MOFA,
“Regarding Discussions Towards Improving China-Japan Relations,” 7 November 2014,
www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.html (accessed on 11 March 2016).
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Xi Jinping Meets Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” 10
November 2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/
t1209092.shtml (accessed on 11 March 2016).
20. Tetsuo Kotani, “Positive Signs for Crisis Management in the East China Sea,” Asia Maritime Trans-
parency Initiative, 4 February 2015, http://amti.csis.org/positive-signs-for-crisis-management-in-
the-east-china-sea (accessed on 11 March 2016).
21. Author’s interview, Tokyo, February 2015.
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Table 2 – Chronology of China-Japan negotiations over a Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism
(MACM)
Date Achievement
21 April 2008, Beijing Inaugural meeting of the working group
26 July 2010, Tokyo Discussion of the overall structure of the mechanism
28, 29 June 2012, Beijing Principled agreement on the structure of the mechanism, based on three pillars
12 January 2015, Tokyo
Resumption of the talks; decision to expand the mechanism to also cover communication between aircraft; 
decision to “implement the mechanism at an early date”
June 2015 Discussion on technical details and reiteration of importance of early implementation
Sources: James Przystup, John Bradford, and James Manicom, “Japan-China Maritime Confidence Building and Communications Mechanisms,” Pacnet Newsletter, No. 67, 20 Au-
gust 2013, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-67-japan-china-maritime-confidence-building-and-communications-mechanisms (accessed on 4 August 2016); Prime Minister
of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference of the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” 13 January 2015, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyoukanpress/201501/13_a.html (accessed on 11 March
2016); email communication with senior Japanese foreign policy analyst, January 2016.
ducted in Tokyo, the Japanese side insisted on a public version. (22) In the
end, however, the key blocking factor was not related to that issue but to
the geographical area covered by the agreement, which the Chinese side
insisted should also apply to the 12 nautical miles territorial sea around the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; according to Chinese experts, the Japanese side in-
sisted on explicitly excluding that region from the final agreement instead
of not specifying the geographical area to which the agreement applied. (23)
As described in the second section, the risk of an incident rose tremen-
dously after 2012, partly as a result of the involvement of Chinese law-en-
forcement agencies in the dispute, with a greater reactive role played by
the Japanese Coast Guards. The Maritime and Air Communication Mecha-
nism does not cover the activities of law-enforcement agencies. The two
sides run a parallel consultation format, the “High-Level Consultation on
Maritime Affairs,” which brings together ministries and agencies involved in
maritime security activities, including the Chinese State Oceanic Adminis-
tration and the Japanese Coast Guard. (24) At the date of writing, these con-
sultations were not aiming to finalise a specific agreement regulating the
activities of the Coast Guards of the two countries but rather served as a
confidence-building exercise at a very preliminary stage, since the Coast
Guards have had even less bilateral interaction than the militaries. Several
Japanese security experts advocated that once finalised, the military-to-
military crisis management mechanism should be extended to the activities
of law-enforcement agencies as well. (25)
From reactive assertiveness to supporting a
Maritime and Aerial Communication
Mechanism
On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two
Japanese Coast Guard ships in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The incident sparked a major outburst of tension in China-Japan relations.
Japan detained the captain and the crew for ten days while the Chinese
government accused Japan of unilateral violation of the status quo on the
grounds that Japanese domestic law was used for the first time on a terri-
tory claimed by China. While the crew was subsequently released, the de-
velopments around the collision – political tensions, diplomatic exchanges
of fire, anti-Japan demonstrations in China, and anti-Chinese sentiment ris-
ing in Japan – made clear that such incidents could generate considerable
deterioration of bilateral relations and in a worst case scenario push the
two nations to the brink of armed conflict. A precedent was set – it illus-
trated the importance of crisis management as an instrument of stability. 
There is a certain asymmetry in the way China and Japan perceive the
maritime and aerial communication mechanism. Concluding a crisis man-
agement agreement has been a priority of Prime Minister Abe’s government.
Japan’s 2014 White Paper on defence policy noted that establishing the
mechanism had become an “urgent matter” in light of recent near-collisions
between the two militaries. The Japanese MOD described the mechanism
as aiming to avoid “unexpected collision and prevent unforeseen conse-
quences in waters and airspace from escalating into military clashes or po-
litical problems, as well as increasing mutual understanding and
relationships of trust, and enhancing defence cooperation.” (26) The necessity
of reaching an agreement was much less overwhelming in Beijing, where
the official discourse stressed the importance of a Japanese change of at-
titude prior to the resumption of negotiations. As a result, throughout the
negotiation process, both sides maintained the perception that the crisis
management mechanism was a Japanese initiative, and was primarily in the
interest of Japan. Neither the Chinese Foreign Ministry nor the larger Chi-
nese strategic community ever framed crisis management as a foreign pol-
icy priority. On the contrary, it was framed as a concession for the sake of
strategic stability and under certain conditions only. In practice, China linked
crisis management negotiations to two broader foreign policy goals: ob-
taining Japan’s recognition of a sovereignty dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; and changing the Abe administration’s approach
to historical issues, especially visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, regarded by China
as a major obstacle to the improvement of bilateral relations. 
The Chinese strategic narrative was articulated around the idea that China
had to reach a new status quo over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after their
“unilateral nationalisation” by Japan. To that end, the Chinese government
went on the offensive in the East China Sea, choosing a policy of open con-
frontation. China’s approach was aptly described in a report by the Inter-
national Crisis Group as “reactive assertiveness.” (27) The aim of the offensive
was to achieve a situation of contested administration of the islands – a
goal never officially acknowledged but quietly pursued by means of three
key decisions. The new status quo sought by Chinese policymakers was one
whereby patrols of military forces and law-enforcement agencies of the two
countries would regularly meet around the islands and in disputed areas of
the East China Sea. As a result, Japanese sovereignty claims would be chal-
lenged not only at the political and diplomatic levels, but also at the more
basic level of daily administration of the islands. A direct consequence of
that policy was a tremendous increase in the risk of incident between the
two sides. 
First, China decided to send regular patrols into the territorial waters and
the contiguous zone around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Graph 1 shows the
frequency of Chinese patrols in the territorial seas (12 nm) and the contigu-
ous zone (24 nm) around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Figures on territorial
seas show an exceptional presence before 2012. The turning point occurred
in September 2012 with 13 patrols in reaction to the “nationalisation” of
three islands by the government of Japan, which shows that patrols are con-
ceived in Beijing as a retaliatory move to reestablish a new status quo.
Monthly peaks occurred regularly from September 2012 to October 2013
reflecting high tensions in the political relationship and raising the risk of
unintended collision. In April and August 2013, 25 and 28 Chinese vessels
were identified by Japan inside the 12 nm zone. Another turning point oc-
curred in October 2013, with a “routinisation” of patrols at around 10 per
month in the territorial seas of the islands. The stabilisation of the frequency
of patrols after a peak gives credit to the thesis that China has achieved reg-
ular contest “on the ground” of Japan’s administration of the islands. 
A key determinant of China’s approach to crisis management in the East
China Sea is the rapid modernisation of China’s law-enforcement capability.
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22. Author’s interview with Japanese official, Tokyo, February 2015. 
23. Author’s interviews with Chinese and Japanese experts, April 2016. 
24. James Przystup, John Bradford, and James Manicom, “Japan-China Maritime Confidence Building
And Communications Mechanisms,” Pacnet Newsletter, No. 67, 20 August 2013,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-67-japan-china-maritime-confidence-building-and-com-
munications-mechanisms (accessed on 4 August 2016).
25. Author’s interviews, Beijing, Tokyo, Stockholm, 2013-2015. 
26. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014 (Annual White Paper), Chapter 3, section 2,
www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html (accessed on 4 August 2016). 
27. International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” Asia Report,
No. 245, 8 April 2013, pp. 12-15. The report defines reactive assertiveness the following way: “Bei-
jing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change the facts on
the ground in its favour.” 
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In this regard the reform of China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies was
a key turning point that enabled China to standardise and systematise its
strategy of patrols. In March 2013, the National People’s Congress voted to
reform China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies, merging four agencies
into a newly-established China Coast Guard. (28) The first occurrence of a Chi-
nese ship with the new Coast Guard logo was July 2013. According to senior
Japanese officials, a typical Coast Guard patrol involved a fleet of three ships,
mostly between 1,000 and 3,000 tons but increasingly larger ships of about
5,000 tons; the possibility in the future of having 10,000-ton Coast Guard
ships is considered serious in Japan. (29) The Coast Guard fleet is commissioning
refitted frigates from the PLA Navy and has adopted the design of the Jiangkai
frigate 054-D, in service in the PLAN, for a new class of 4,000-ton Coast Guard
ships. (30) The empowerment of the China Coast Guard and the State Oceanic
Administration has kept tensions at a lower level than if the PLA Navy had
been in charge of regular patrols, and seeks to send the political message do-
mestically and internationally that the issue is a domestic one. 
Second, Chinese air presence over the disputed islands also increased
tremendously after 2012. In November 2013, China announced the estab-
lishment of an East China Sea ADIZ, overlapping Japan’s in the East China
Sea and over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (see Map 1). While this is com-
mon practice for many states across the world, China’s ADIZ was clearly
part of a strategy to challenge Japan’s administration of the islands, and a
retaliatory move against the public purchase. The establishment of the
ADIZ was also intended to change the global coverage of developments in
the East China Sea. Chinese defence analysts regularly complain that Japan
has an edge in terms of public diplomacy because it releases data on Chi-
nese intrusions in its sovereign territories (used in this article), shaping the
thinking of analysts worldwide and framing the public debate internation-
ally. After the ADIZ was established, the Chinese English press started re-
leasing information on Japanese intrusions into China’s ADIZ. (31) While it
is clear that China lacks the capacity to fully enforce its ADIZ regulations
and interdict all military flights by Japan or the US, the announcement
paved the way for increasing the frequency of Chinese air patrols in the
area, and also created an argument based on domestic law to support the
legitimacy of these patrols. China had only flown one aircraft (of the State
Oceanic Administration) into the airspace of the Islands, in December
2012, when tensions with Japan reached a peak, but flights within the East
China Sea north of the islands have increased since an ADIZ was declared.
A good indicator of the impact on bilateral ties is the number of scrambles
by the Japanese Air Force (see Graph 2).
Third, the PLA Navy’s presence also increased near the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands. In November 2015, a Dongdiao-class PLA Navy intelligence-gath-
ering ship was identified south of the contiguous zone of the islands. (32) In
June 2016, a PLA Navy ship was spotted inside the 24 nautical miles zone
for the first time, and the Chinese Ambassador was summoned by the
Japanese government. (33) This marked a symbolic escalation following sev-
eral occurrences of Chinese Navy ships drawing closer to the islands, and
possibly in connection with the stalled crisis management negotiations,
since for the first time the source of the stalemate become a concrete se-
curity problem, with a PLAN ship in the area to be included or excluded
from the final agreement. By and large, Chinese naval strategy around the
islands has been to show the flag through law-enforcement agencies and
refrain from sending navy ships. There are at least two reasons for that. One
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Graph 1 – The numbers of Chinese government and other vessels that entered the contiguous zone and
territorial seas surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (as of 31 July 2016)
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)
Source: Courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “The Numbers of Chinese Government and other Vessels that Entered Japan's Contiguous Zone or Intruded
into Territorial Sea Surrounding the Senkaku Islands (As of July 31),” graph accessible at www.mofa.go.jp/files/000170838.pdf (accessed on 18 August 2016).
is that law-enforcement ships project the political signal that this is about
a routine public security operation on Chinese territory. Second, the law-
enforcement presence guarantees a lower level of conflictuality, even
though some armaments are carried on board the vessels. Ultimately, law-
enforcement vessels can be backed by PLA Navy ships if they are in the
vicinity, as made clear by several recent examples in the South China Sea.
As a result of this increased presence of armed vessels and aircraft, the need
for a crisis management agreement became more urgent, as a series of near-
collisions made clear (see Table 3). A turning point occurred after the summer
of 2014. In September, the High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs con-
vened in Qingdao. This was the second meeting following the inaugural one in
May 2012. The representatives of the two sides reached a consensus “in principle
to resume consultations for an early implementation of a maritime communi-
cation mechanism between the defence authorities of the two countries.” (34)
This was followed by the November 2014 four-point consensus and the Abe-
Xi summit in Beijing. The timeline suggests that a decision was taken in China
to resume negotiations over the communication mechanism before a consen-
sus was formally reached regarding the broader state of the relationship. 
Why did China move from a policy centred on confrontation and as-
sertiveness to a resumption of military diplomacy? The question is worth
asking as the 2014 “four points principled agreement” only vaguely ad-
dresses the preconditions that China had set for resuming talks with Japan-
ese defence authorities. It does not include a Japanese recognition of the
existence of a sovereignty dispute but an acknowledgement that “different
positions” exist “regarding the tensions which have emerged in recent
years.” It does not include a Japanese commitment that the Prime Minister
will no longer visit the Yasukuni Shrine but mentions the “spirit of facing
history squarely and looking forward to the future.” (35) As unspecific as it
might read, the language of the document successfully defused China’s sen-
sitivities; it was in fact presented by Chinese experts as setting a new course
for China-Japan relations under Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe. (36) The document
reflects a political decision to “create a space for ambiguity.” (37) The follow-
ing section discusses the possible causes of that political decision. 
Chinese experts’ view on crisis management
with Japan
Crisis management (weiji guankong) is a relatively new term in China’s
strategic community. Negotiating security with rivals has traditionally been
perceived in China as either a sign of weakness or leverage to extract political
concessions. In China’s maritime periphery, including the East and South
China Seas and the Taiwan issue, where crisis management and confi-
dence-building have repeatedly been recommended by security experts
and frequently discussed at the Track 1 and 2 levels, no binding agreement
was concluded between China and its rivals. In the South China Sea, no
progress has been made since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN, a non-binding
declaration that was supposed to pave the way for the signature of a bind-
ing code of conduct. A military hotline was finally established between
China and Taiwan in December 2015, at a very late stage of the second
term of Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan, in a context of good political relations
(after the Ma-Xi summit in Singapore), and at the height of the campaign
for presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan. (38) During periods of
exceptional tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, confi-
dence-building measures were systematically raised by the Taiwanese side
and rejected by Beijing unless important concessions on sovereignty
would be accepted by Taipei. 
As a research field in security studies institutes, crisis management has
attracted a degree of attention in China. Alastair Iain Johnston has described
how key research institutions within the Chinese military (National Defense
University, China Foundation for International Strategic Studies) and the
Ministry of State Security (China Institutes for Contemporary International
Relations) have developed a body of theoretical literature on crisis man-
agement since the early 1990s, largely inspired by their study of American
production on the same topic. (39) Lessons learned from crises in US-China
relations were particularly important in shaping the thinking in China re-
garding crisis management. Johnston notes that the structural contradiction
between traditional military operational thinking and crisis management
also applies to China, and tends to slow down the progress of advocates of
crisis management. Overall, though, the number of in-depth Chinese pub-
lications on crisis management negotiations with Japan is extremely limited,
and opinion pieces in Chinese language supporting the idea are even less
numerous – although both exist. 
Chinese analysts agree on the temporary nature of crisis management
arrangements – by definition completely distinct from attempts at crisis res-
olution. A main dividing line relates to whether or not they see value in trying
to stabilise a relationship by diminishing the risk of military incident or es-
calation in case an unintended collision occurs. Interviews conducted with
maritime security experts in Beijing showed that many perceived the risk of
incident as ultimately linked to “political will” – in other words, there is no
incident if there is a political decision at the top to avoid dangerous behav-
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Graph 2 – Number of scrambles against Chinese
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iour. (40) Many Chinese analysts tend to associate crisis management with
the notion of “strategic trust” (zhanlüe huxin), arguing that only the latter
provides a solid foundation for a stable relationship. Hong Yuan (China Acad-
emy of Social Sciences) argues that crisis management negotiations reflect
an overly micro approach and that only strategic trust at the level of the
leadership can avoid military incidents; he combines this argument with a
nationalistic discourse, presenting crisis management as a Western tool unfit
for Asian states. (41) Regular exchanges with Chinese think-tanks suggest that
this school of thought dominates, although this is a qualitative assessment. 
Some Chinese scholars have reflected on the lack of support for crisis man-
agement with Japan. Chu Xiaobo from Peking University argues that the well-
known Chinese word for crisis (weiji), composed of the characters “risk” and
“opportunity” and widely commented in the West as revealing a specific Chinese
approach to crises, is in fact limiting the thinking in China, because most thinkers
tend to analyse crises exclusively in terms of seeking strategic opportunities. He
also notes the absence of opinion leaders supporting the idea in public. (42)
At the same time, risk assessment in China has evolved as a result of
close encounters involving the PLA, leading some Chinese analysts to ac-
knowledge the risk of unexpected incident with Japan. For example, Chi-
nese military analysts acknowledged the existence of four scenarios of
incidents:
• A collision outside territorial waters involving naval forces, law-enforce-
ment agencies, or fishing boats;
• A collision inside territorial waters;
• The landing of individuals on the islands;
• A military incident resulting from surveillance and reconnaissance activ-
ities in disputed areas. (43)
Shifting perceptions regarding the level of security risk is clearly a factor
shaping China’s approach to crisis management negotiations. However, a
second main determinant is China’s perception of the political benefits that
can be secured through the negotiations. For example, Zhao Tong (Tsinghua
University) argues that crisis management negotiations are the next logical
step after the conclusion of the four-point consensus. He argues that for
China, crisis management has three goals: (1) avoiding incidents while the
two sides protect their “de facto administration” (shiji kongzhiquan) of the
islands; (2) avoiding escalation when incidents occur; (3) preventing limited
incidents over sovereignty or historical issues from affecting the overall re-
lationship. (44) The first argument is the most interesting one, in the sense
that it suggests a willingness to freeze a new status quo whereby Chinese
ships would be accepted around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by Japan, which
would amount to a tacit acknowledgement by Japan of the notion of shared
administration of the islands – anathema to the Abe administration.
Similarly, Yu Tiejun (Peking University) observes that crisis management ne-
gotiations are occurring as China has already successfully reached an interme-
diary goal in the East China, making the international community realise that
there is a sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and thus un-
dermining the key feature of Japan’s narrative. (45) Throughout the seven years
of negotiations, it also appeared clear – although it remains to be confirmed
officially – that China was seeking very specific diplomatic outcomes. This ap-
pears in a paper published by Zhang Tuosheng, one the most prominent advo-
cates of crisis management in China’s strategic community: (46)
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Table 3 – List of near-collisions and military incidents in the East China Sea (2013-2015)
Date Event Remarks
19 January 2013
A Chinese frigate locks fire control radar on Japanese naval helicopter 
in the East China Sea
PLA denies the facts, Japanese military
refuses to release evidence to protect
intelligence collection capacities
30 January 2013
A Chinese naval vessel locks fire control radar on a Japanese destroyer near disputed
islands in the East China Sea
PLA denies the facts, Japanese military
refuses to release evidence to protect
intelligence collection capacities
24 May 2014 Japan accuses China of dangerous flight 12 meters from Japanese aircraft
11 June 2014
Two Japanese F-15 fighters fly within 30 meters of a Chinese Tu-154 in the overlapping
ADIZs while monitoring a Chinese military exercise
Chinese MOD releases video and accuses
Japan of “seriously affecting flight safety”
Sources: “Japan Protests over China Ship’s Radar Action,” BBC News, 5 February 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21337444 (accessed on 4 August 2016); “Japan May 
Release Data Proving Chinese Radar Incident,” Reuters, 8 February 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-idUSBRE91801B20130209 (accessed on 4 August 2016); 
Sui-Lee Wee, “China Denounces Japan Protest over Military Jets’ Close Brush,” Reuters, 12 June 2014, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-planes-idUSKBN0EN0L720140612
(accessed on 4 August 2016).
• No personnel of either side should set foot on the islands or go within
the 12-nautical-miles territorial-sea limit set by the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 
• Both sides should refrain from carrying out construction or other activi-
ties on the islands;
• No deployment of military assets of either side should take place near
the islands or surrounding waters; 
• Law enforcement vessels from both countries should keep an appropriate
distance.
China’s choice: Political gain before military
security risk
Crisis management negotiations with Japan are failing on a predictable
issue, sovereignty and different understandings of the nature of the status
quo – precisely the element that needs to be set aside to achieve tangible
outcomes. The Chinese insistence on applying the agreement in the 12nm
zone of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was perceived by the Japanese side as
a further attempt to degrade the de facto Japanese administration of the
islands. This Chinese request followed a pattern of decisions taken since the
Japanese public purchase of three islands in September 2012, all resulting
in a de facto contestation of Japan’s previously unchallenged administration
of the islands – at least unchallenged at sea. In the end, it appears that China
tried to achieve a more secure environment for their patrols in the disputed
territorial waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – waters in which they
only very exceptionally operated before the negotiations started in 2008. 
In addition to this core obstacle, over the course of the negotiations and
especially after their resumption in 2015, the Japanese side had two main
security concerns regarding the usefulness of the mechanism, even though
Japan remained committed to finalising the negotiations. The first was
that China might use the mechanism and the negotiations “to neutralise
a Japanese response to an incident and bind the Japanese military to a
less than proportional response.” (47) The second concern was related to
the sustainability and efficiency of the mechanism. Would the Chinese
military follow the rules of the agreement after having made diplomatic
gains by signing it? Would the mechanism survive the next deterioration
in bilateral relations over historical or other issues? These remain hypo-
thetical questions as long as the mechanism is not in place, but they sug-
gest that the level of distrust regarding Chinese military policy is very high
in Tokyo. 
To sum up China’s approach to crisis management negotiations and their
role in China’s East China Sea policy, it appears that they have served two
main goals: 
• First, China’s diplomacy on crisis management negotiations signals its
overall assessment of the state of the relationship with Japan. In other
words, it mirrors larger concerns instead of being used as an instrument
to improve the overall relationship. During the summer of 2014, it ap-
pears that a decision was taken in Beijing to lower the level of tension
with Japan, which led to a decision to resume the talks, a decision that
was taken before the four-point consensus was even concluded. 
• Second, in the particular case of the East China Sea, crisis management
negotiations have been used to secure a new status quo after the pur-
chase of the islands by the government of Japan, depicted by Beijing as
a unilateral violation of the status quo ante. In other words, China tried
to use the negotiations to consolidate the gains that had been achieved
– from Beijing’s perspective – through the unprecedented explosion in
the number of patrols by law-enforcement agencies since the end of
2012. 
This analysis suggests that China’s approach to crisis management and
confidence-building is overly determined by the search for political gain
and is not sufficiently linked to a goal defined in terms of security; the risk
of military incident is clearly not the main determinant of China’s overall
approach to negotiations with Japan and was never successfully isolated as
an independent variable that should be addressed separately. 
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